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REPORTTHIRTEENTH )SIXTEEN

REP OF

THE INTERNATIONAL BODY

22 January 1996

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communiqué which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations."

2. One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known as the political track.

3. The other track concerned decommissioning and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:

"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."

4. We are that Body. This is our report. We are an outside group with no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent fresh and unbiased perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.

5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, December 15 through 18, 1995; the second, January 11 through 22, 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.

6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other organisations, inrelevant persons. A lisst of all those witutions, and individualsh whom we met is attached. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. Contributionsfrom those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

II. DISCUSSION

7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the problem, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.

8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and Taosieach John Bruton (and, before him, Albert Reynolds) are essential steps to a lasting peace. We commend as well the individual actions of some political parties and their leaders and of other institutions, organisations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.

9. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations should be able to be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish governments to advance the peace process.

10. For nearly a year and a half,ThTha NS1W are convinced that the guns have been sivast majority of peoplent in Northern Ireland. The people want seek lasting peace and reconciliation in a just society in which paramilitary violence pviolence or the threat of violence plays no part. Members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been largely silent in Northern Ireland. All with whom we spoke agreed that people want peace. ThaIt was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from people N, north and Ssouth, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.

113. Notwithstanding recent reprehensible "punishment" killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires reflects a commitment by the paramilitary organizations to the peace process. The existence of the ceasefires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommithe removal of weapons from the political processioning.

12. Since the cease--fires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all- party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists -- so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

13. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.

14. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked "to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue issue." It is a serious issue. IBut iproblemt is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absenceat may be described in a word: Trust. Or, more precisely, the lack of trust.

Put simply, neither side trusts the other. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.

15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue -- or any other issue -- will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventoriepacked arsenals of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.

16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire.

17. EWe are satisfied that everyone with whom we spokle agrees in principle with the need to decommissioning. There are differences on the timing and context -- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but they should not obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total annd verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That is, and until it is achieved must continue to be, a paramount objective.

18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE

19. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.

20. Accordingly, we recommend the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:

a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;

b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;

c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;

d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all party negotiations;

e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,

Vf. To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

21. We join the GGovernments, religious and community leaders, and many others in condemning "punishment" killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again in the future.

Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to suchSuch actions have no place negotiations publicly affirm their total and absolute commitment:

6.Tourgethatpunishmentkillingsand beatings stop a lawful society.

nd totake effective steps to prevent such actions

22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The principles we recommend address those concerns directly.First, eThen, in econtext ofy

23. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the threat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations., They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: Tan agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will be truly be an exercise in democracy.

IV. COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING

24. The second of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks uwe were asked to respond waés "to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve" [full and verifiable decommissioning].

25. We are unable to answer that question without reference to timing. That is because we have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.

26P6ior decommissioning is unlikely to occur. We reached that conclusion only a29. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded. That was the view of the vast the paramilmajoritary of the organisations will not decomand individuals who made oral and written submission any armss. It is not that they all are opposed to prior to all-party negotidecommissioning. To the contrary, many favor it. But they are convinced that will not happens. That was also the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to the paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of t

The vast majorality of the orgsand wisations and individuals who made oral and writtendom of such a circumstance wasI the submissions. It is not that they aject of intense debate byre all opposed to prior decommissioning. To many of the contrary, many favparticipants in our it. But they are convinced thameetings, but iit it will not happen. That is the realityis nonetheless a circumstance with which all concerned must deal.

27. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that

the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and disposal of illegally held arms, and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the necessity of prior decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and should not now be able to avoid that requirement.

28. In the competing view we were told was that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who entered into cease-fires did so in the good faith belief they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the cease-fires, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no further requirements.

29. We believe that each side of this cept pargument reflects a core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.ch.

From t

30. Those who insidemandst on prior decommissioning need to be reassuredwe accept the view that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is gre is a need for something to provide the confidence necessary to enuine and irreversible, and thll-party negotiations the threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiations or to change any agreedo begin.

From those who oppose decommissioning we accept the view that it is unlikely that prior decommissioning will occur.

Therefore, somettlement.hing else is nee

31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for the peaceful political path need to be reassurded to create the trust necessary to begin all-party negotiations. Indeed, that a meaningful and ibsenclusive of process of negotiations is genuinely being offerior decommissioning increases the need to address ththe legitimate concerns of their traditions ose who demsand it. The need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.

32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcy are entitled to have the shadow of violence lifted frome this impae pe32. ace processe. That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.

V. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

33. The parties may wishould to36. Tsh consider, as an alternative, an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge.

34. Such an approach represents a middle course. It off.

From one side has come the demand that there must be some decommissioning before negotiations can begin. From the others has comprom34. sinsistence that enables alno decommissioning can occur until the very end of process, afterparticipate in all-party negotiationshave produced.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE stheentsuMODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

35. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us "to identify and advise on paragraph seven of a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning."

36. WC, thé modalities of decommissioninge recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations areflect realistic in lightmates of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided to us by the gGovernments and their security forservices. We believe these estimates to the accurate.guilines should be acceptable to all who would participate in the negotiations. The details wouldthr

37. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves.

a. The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.

38. The cease-fires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to surrender.

b. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to public safety.

39. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments. Procedures for the destruction of armaments would include the physical destruction of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal.

40. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including: the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either government; and the destruction of armaments by those currently in possession of them.

41. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

c. The decommissioning process should be verified by an independent commission.third party

42. The decommissioning process should be verified by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.

43. The commission should be able to operate without hindependentlyrance in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

44. Individuals or organisations wishing to deposit armaments for decommissioning (including weapons, explosives, ammunition and detonators), or to provide information which wcould result in the decommissioning of armaments, shwould have the option of doing so through the commission or through the designated representatives of the British or Irish Governments. Parties shwould also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves, subject to verification by the commission.

45. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

d. The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.

46. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prosecuted for the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.

47. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

es and in all-party negotiationll cases, t47. , within the two jurisdictionshe dEThe decommissioning process shwprocess ould be mutual.

fully verified by the .48. Decommission, whiching would take place record information required to monitor the basis of the mutual commitment and participationprocess effectively, other than that which could be deemed to constitute forensic evidence. In monitoring progress, the commission should have available to it the relevant data of the pGarda Siochana and and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The commission would report periodically to relevant paryties on progress achieved in the decommisatssioning process. This offers

5. Decommissioning should be mutual

Details regarding the implementarties an oon of the decommissioning process, including supporting confidence-building measures and ity to uss timing and sequencing, should receive a high priority in the process of dall-party negotiations. Decommissioning would take place on the build confidasis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organizationsone step at a time during negotiations.

VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

49. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many subjects other than decommissioning were raised which are relevant to the peace development of trust. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit. But we believe it appropriate to comment on some of them since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of arms.

50. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.

5(1. Continued language on socio-economic measures; e.g. Finally in the discussions we had, the social and economic development of Northern Ireland, and its communities, was emphasized time and again in establishing a lasting peace...)

51. action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So, too, would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

52. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those lawfully authorised. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."

53. We share the hope, expressed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as feasible. AL3kewise, a53. s review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons, the use of plastic bullets, and We also sharehope, expssed byhe Royal Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Norcontinued progress toward more balanced representation in thern Ipolice force, would contribute to thland can be normalized as soon as possiblbuilding of trust.

54. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We notenote the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Bodies elected reference in accoparagraph three ofacrdance with democratic principles express and reflect the Communiqué to "wwill of the people. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-str and howprocess, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.

55. Finally, in our meetings, the importance of further progress in social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasty a part." Bodies electesd ing peace.

cVIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

56eccepted pr and equitablation express flect5. Last week we stood iof the people. Tof, an Belfast and looked at a thirty foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron ected body should includee requisit, operatehthree-strand barbed wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division ofprocess, and servnlyo faciite agreementree strands.IX. The divisiand edand at barriers iron and eons in Northern Ireland into two hostilee groups. To the outsider both are warm historic and deep, but we band generous. Between themselieves they are fearful and hostile.

outweighed by57. Yet, it is the now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. Thely universal longing for a just d lastingre is a powerful desire for peace in Northern Ireland. It is that desire which creates the present opportunity.

58. This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society Bold and courageous leadersh58. Tcould slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.

59. Rigid adherence by the parties tow their past positions will simply continulate the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching acrossto the "peace line" requires a willingness to take risks forty of peace.

60. The risk is high but the reward is greater: a future of peace, equality and prosperity.

George J. Mitchell John de Chastelain Harri Holkeri

22 January 1996