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REPORT OF

THE INTERN7ATIONAL BODY

22 January 1996

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communiqué which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations."

2. One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known as the political track.

3. The other track concerned decommissioning and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:

"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

"6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

"7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

"8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."

T4. We are that Body. This is our report. We isare an outside group withose members have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of itsthe people of Northern Ireland to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent, perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.

5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, December 15 through 18, 1995; the second, January 11 through 22, 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.

6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other organisations, institutions, and individualsB. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. Contributionsfrom those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

II. DISCUSSION

7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the problem, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiationtalks can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.

8. Tamong people of both traditions hat nogted, wThe areInternational Body is aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and Taosieach John Reynolds and Bruton, in brokering the joint (agreements in the Downing Street Declaration and the Framework Documents, abefore him Albert Reynolds)s) well as in the Joint Communique of November 1995, are essential steps to any final plan for a lasting peace. We coSo, too,mmend as well the individual actions of some political parties and , of otheir leaderorganizations and of other institutions, organisations, paramilitary groups themselves in declarings and maindividuals taining the promotion of peaceceasefires.

9. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations should be able to be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish governments to advance the peace process.

10. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. The people want lasting peace in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from people North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.

1e know willad n the Republic iWe believe that marmay follow13. Notwithstanding some recent reprehensible "punishment" killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.

12. Since the cease-fires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists -- so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. ITh factuch widespread agreement exists is tribute to the vision and courage of many people, in particular Prime Minister Major, Taoiseach Bruton and his predecessor Albert Reynolds, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Mayhew and Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs Spring. Indeed, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

13. No onT3e Governments and the relevant parties15. should not underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.

14. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked "to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue." It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absence of trust. CommIf there was one to many ofhing common to our meetings wereit was a litany of rgumeasonts, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.

15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue -- or any other issue -- will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.

16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire. sug17teEblish trust and build cokfidence, even though most athe need to re outside the scope of our remit. We do so because we believe that the important objective of all-party negotiations to reach an agreed political settlement cannot be achieved solely by reference to the issue of decommissioning.

17.The Governments have established a two-track process. Progress on the political track is as essential - perhaps even more essential - as progress on the decommissioning track. Nothing we say or do on decommissioning will by itself achieve the Governments' overall objective of all-party negotiations. That requires action on both tracks. And what both tracks have in common is the absence of trust.

We urge all of the parties to try to understand the reality of and the basis for others' fears and mistrust; and we ask the Governments and the parties to carefully consider how dealing with each of the following matters can help build the trust that is now so conspicuously lacking. The following list is neither all-inclusive nor in order of importance, but represents the subjects most often raised with us:

-- Questions related to prisoners: We are told that paramilitary prisoners play an important role in shaping the decisions taken by paramilitary leaderships. Additional measures affecting the duration of sentences of paramilitary prisoners, facilitating the transfer of prisoners under relevant conventions and agreements; and assisting the reintegration of prisoners into society could boost trust and confidence.

-- Punishment killings and beatings: Control and elimination of vigilanteeism, including alleviation of the circumstances that give rise to such deplorable phenomena, could boost trust and confidence.

-- Acceptance of the principle of consent: This is a fundamental principle of democracy. Any alteration in the status of a political entity can occur only with the consent of the population of that entity. The principle of consent, as a bedrock of democracy, demands respect for the views of groups that constitute a minority as well as an equitable role in the exercise of political life within that a given political entity.

-- Legally held weapons in private hands: We are told that a review of rules and regulations pertaining to possession and use of legally held weapons to ensure that the principles of fairness and even-handedness apply and to remove perceptions of potential intimidation could boost trust and confidence.

-- The status of policing: We are told that measures to improve the standing of the police in all communities, to increase the participation of minority populations in the force, and strive toward the achievement of the goal of unarmed police, in concert with evaluation of security situation, could boost trust and confidence.

-- Emergency legislation: We are told that review, modification, and, consonant with an evaluation of the security situation, eventual elimination of emergency legislation, could boost trust and confidence.

-- Commitment of parties to democracy: An unambiguous, unconditional devotion to the ideals and practice of democracy is the sine qua non for participation in politics and the maintenance of peace in a civil society.

-- Human rights issues: The fate of the "disappeared" is an example. We are told that an accounting of the fate of those who disappeared as the result of paramilitary activities, including a determination of the location of their remains, could boost trust and confidence.

-- Paramilitary activities: We are told that despite the ceasefire, paramilitaries continue surveillance and targetting, thus sustaining a climate of fear and intimidation. Cessation of such activities could build trust and confidence among the paramilitaries and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. Similarly, adoption of a no-first-strike pledge by all paramilitaries could reduce tensions.

-- Elected assembly: Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected assembly. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communique to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Elected bodies are of course the essence of democracy, offering an opportunity to air differences in a democratic way. Bodies elected in accordance with accepted principles of representation express and reflect the will of the people. The political track is beyond the scope of our remit. But the importance of establishing trust and building confidence is not. And an elected body with an appropriate mandate and timeline could play a role within the three-strand context in establishing the trust and building the confidence necessary for an equitable settlement agreed by all parties. Accordingly, in the course of all-party negotiations all participants should demonstrate a willingness to engage seriously on the subject of an elected assembly.

Different views were expressed to us as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communique, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organizations. We accept and share the view that there is no equivalence between such weapons and those lawfully authorized. In this regard, however, we welcome the commitment of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, as stated in paragraph 9 of the Communique, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."

(add language to the effect that what we say or do will not fully solve the problem)

III. We are satisfied that everyone with whom we spole agrees in principle with deith respect to decommissioning, wcommission. There are differences on the timing and context -- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but they should not obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That must continue to be a paramount objective.

18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE

19. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.

20. Accordingly, we recommend the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:

a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;

b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;

c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;

d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all party negotiations;

e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,

f. To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

21. We join the Governments, religious leaders, and many others in condemning "punishment" killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful society.

22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The principles we recommend address those concerns directly.

23. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the threat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations. They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmamente timetable for decommissiosing and other su of all paramilitary organiszations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise in democracy.

IV. COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING

24. The second of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us "to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.

25. We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.

26. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilitary organisations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of the vast majority of the organisations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that thee isy are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will not happen. Thaut is thetnon realityfact with which all concerned must deal.

27. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and disposal of illegally held arms, and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the necessity of prior decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and should not now be able to avoid that requirement.

28. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who entered into cease-fires did so in the belief they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the cease-fires, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no further requirements.

29. We believe that each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.

30. Those who associated with insist on prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is genuine and irreversible, and that the threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiations or to change any agreed settlement.

31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiations is genuinely being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their traditions and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.

32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.

V. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

33. The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge.

34. Such an approach represents a middle course. It offers ans, accept the need to advance cparticipate inreasonable compromise that enables all to participate inmove forward toward their common objective: all-party negotiations.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE wosomeithly associatedeall-MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

35. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us "to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning."

36. We recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided to us by the governments and their security forces. We believe these estimates to be accurate.fear

37. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves.

a. The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.

38. The cease-fires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to surrender.

b. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to public safety.

39. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments. Procedures for the destruction of armaments would include the physical destruction of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal.

40. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including: the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either government; and the destruction of armaments by those currently in possession of them.

41. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

c. The decommissioning process should be verified by an independent commission.

42. The decommissioning process should be verified by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.

43. The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

44. Individuals or organisations wishing to deposit armaments for decommissioning (including weapons, explosives, ammunition and detonators), or to provide information which could result in the decommissioning of armaments, should have the option of doing so through the commission or through the designated representatives of the British or Irish Governments. Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves, subject to verification by the commission.

45. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

d. Tthe decommissioning process should incipnot expose individuales to wprosecution.

46. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prcomosecuted for the posasession of thollh se armaments; amnesties should be establ tboished in law in both jurisdithctions. Atotal disarmaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.

47. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

ea. The dDecommissioning process should be mutual.

487. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organisations. This offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.

VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

49. It Theiswill be important for all participants to takectical steps to build confidence throughout the peace procestiations. In the course of our discussions, isions in Northern Imany subjects other than decommissioning were raised which are relevant to the d are historic and deep,development of trust. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit. But we believe it appropriate to comment on some of them since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of arms.

50. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary weve they are outweighed byactivities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.

51. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So, too, would early implementation of the nearly universal longing forproposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

52. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those lawfully authorised. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitmentords of one of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continuose with whom wée to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threake: "The single most potent foreduces."

53. We share the hope, expressed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as feasible. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons, the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force, would contribute to the building of trust.

54. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected Irish life today isbody. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Bodies elected in accordance with democratic principles express anbe c for peace." Id reflect the will of the people. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand process, an elective process couldat is true, contribute to the building of confidenwe hope it is, then there is an opportunity to translatce.

55. Finally, in our meetings, the importance of further progress in social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

56re into

57. Last week we wi p

ethe and parted to their past positionshpeoand in Belfastat barriers pl whom we miron and et, d and looked lliontwat in the centra half more we of Belfast looking at a thirty foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division of Northern Ireland d not meet ofinto two hostile groups. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselvhospresence we felt. At they are is critical momens thfearful and hostile.

57. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. Theire history,is a powerful desire for peace in urge theirNorthern Ireland.rs to seizeIt is that desire which creates the present opportunity.

58. This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.

59. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the "peace line" requires a willingness to take risks for peace.

60. The risk is high but the reward is greater: a future of peace, equality and prosperity.

George J. Mitchell John de Chastelain Harri Holkeri

22 January 1996