The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was appointed as part of the twin-track process. It was led by the people who would later become the Independent Chairmen of the 1996-1998 peace talks. They produced the Mitchell report, which set out, amongst other recommendations, a list of principles which all parties signed up to as the basis for the talks.
This Committee was appointed by the British Government to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Committee wrote their report between Friday 19th January and Monday 22nd January. They sent one copy each to the British and Irish Governments on the evening of the 22nd January. The report was released to the public at a press conference on Wednesday 24th January at 1000.
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Version 1 of the Mitchell Principles. Date of creation unknown
THIRTEENTH DRAFT - REORDERED BY STAFFwelfth Draft
INTRODUCTION
On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communiqué which announced the launching of a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations."
One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known as the political track.
The other track concerned decommissioning and was set forth in the Communiqué:
"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.
6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.
7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.
8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."
We are an outside group with no stake Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring a fresh and unbiased perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help.
To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London; the first December 15 through 18, 1995, the second January 11 through 21, 1996. In addition, we held an organizational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.
In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other relevant persons. A list of all those with whom we met is attached. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.
This assessment represents our best and our unanimous judgement. There are no differences among us.
Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the problem, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed, so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.
That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Ministers Major and Bruton (and before him Reynolds) are essential steps to a lasting peace. We commend as well the individual actions of some political parties and their leaders and of other institutions, organizations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.
We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for collaboration with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. The events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire. That knowledge encourages us in making our recommendations.
We are convinced that the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland seek lasting peace and reconciliation in a just society in which violence or the threat of violence plays no part. Members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been largely silent in Northern Ireland. All with whom we spoke agreed that people want peace. It was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
Notwithstanding recent reprehensible punishment killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the ceasefires reflects a commitment by the paramilitary organizations to the peace process. The existence of the ceasefires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" the removal of weapons from the political process.
Since the cease-fires the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists - so widespread, in fact, that it tends to be taken for granted.
No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.
II. We were asked to provide an independent assessment We were asked to deal with the issue of decommissioning. It is a serious problem. But it is also a symptom of a larger problem that may be described in a word: Trust. Or, more precisely, the lack of trust.
Put simply, neither side trusts the other. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.
But a resolution of the decommissioning issue - or any other issue - will not be found if the parties resort to their packed arsenals of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mindsets in Northern Ireland. Establishing trust will require courage and involve risk. But the risks of a continued lack of trust are much greater.
III. We belare satisfied that eve public ryone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with decommitment and adhssioning. There are differences on to fundamental prihe timing and context - indeed those differenciples of democracy and non-violence wled to the creation of this Body - but they should helpnot be allowed to buildobscure the necessarly trust. All those who aspiruniversal support which exists for the to participattal and verifiable disarmament of all- paramilitary negotiorganizations should affirm their commitme. That is, and until it is achieved must continue to such principlesbe, a paramount objective.
(IV. With reinspect to the first principle on punishment beatings)
III. Accordof the specific questions contained in paragraph seven of the Communiqué, the modalities of decommissioningly, we recommend that parties to such negoe following principles. These recommendations reflect what we understand to be accurate estimations publicly affirm theires of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question. We believe the principles should be acceptable to all who would participate in the negotal and absolute commitment:iations. The details would have to be determined by the parties themselves through negotiation.
1. To democratic and exclusivelyhe decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat
The ceasefires and the peaceful mean process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness tof addresolvings differences through political issues;
2. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations;
3. To agmeans. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that suchany party lose face.
The decommisarmament mustsioning process should be verifiabled by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission;
4. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by others, to use force, British and Irish Governments or threaten the usebasis of force, to influence the coursconsultations with the or the outcome of all partyr parties to the negotiations;ng process.
5. To agreThe commission should be able to abide by the terms ofoperate without hindrance in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy agreement reached ppropriate legal status and immunity. In addition to having all-party negotiationsvailable to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and toadequate field resorturces to democraticreceive and audit armaments and exclusively peaceful methods in tryingto observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources any aspect ofd the relevant technical expertise outcome wf the British which they may disagreand Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.
Individuals order organizations wishing to be meaningfuldeposit armaments (including weapons, explosives, ammunition and effective, such detonators) for decommissioning, or to provide information which would result in the decommitssioning of armaments, would, have the option of course, have to applydoing so through the commission or through the paramilitary organizadesignated representatives of the British or Irish Governments. Parties would also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves, subject to verification by the commission.
We join the Governments, relig2. The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution
Individuals andirectly involved in the decommunity leaders, and many others in condemning punishment killings and beatings. They contribute to theissioning process should be protected from prosecution relating to the possession of those armaments, on the basis of amnesties established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obthained as a result of those who have used violence to resolve politicale decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organize their participation in the decommissues inioning process as the past will do so again iy judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on the future. Accordingly, we recommend that tir behalf.
The decommissioning process could encompass a varties to suchty of methods, subject to negotiations publicly affi, including: the transfer of armaments to the commission or total and absolute commitment the designated representatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of information to the commission or to designat punished representatives of either government kill, leading to the discovery of and beatings stop and to take effectivrmaments for subsequent destruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commistepsion tor by representatives of either government; and the destruction of armaments by those acurrently in possessions of them.
IV. The sIn all cases, the decommissiond ofing process should result in the specific qucomplete destructions to which we were asked to respond was "to report whe of the armaments. Procedures for the destruction of armaments would include the physical destruction of small arms and other weapons, there is a clear co controlled explosion of ammunitment on the partion and explosives, and other forms of those in possession ofconventional munitions disposal, within the two jurisdictions. Priority suchould be arms to work constructively to achieve [fullccorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and verifiablstored, and are not misappropriated.
We are sat process would be fully verified by the commission, which would record information required that everyone wio monitor the process effectively, other than that whom we spoke agrees in principle wiich could be deemed to constitute forensic evidence. In monitoring progress, the decommissioning. There are differences on should have available to it the relevant data of the timingGarda Siochana and context - indeed those differences led tothe Royal Ulster Constabulary. The commission would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the creation of this Body -decommissioning process.
4. Decommissioning should be mutual
Details regarding they should not be allowed to obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament implementation of the decommissioning process, including supporting confidence-building measures and its timing and sequencing, should receive a high priority in the process of all-party negotiations. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of allthe paramilitary organizations.
V. That is, and until it is achieved muste second specific question to which we were asked to respond was "to report whether there is a clear commitmentinue to be, a on the part of those in possession of such aramount objective.ms to work constructively to achieve [full and verifiable decommissioning]."
We are unable to answer that question without reference to timing. That is because we have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.
Prior decommissioning is unlikely to occur. We reached that conclusion only after careful consideration, based upon intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the leadership of the security forces, north and south, and many others. That was the view of the vast majority of the organizations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they all are opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favor it. But they are convinced that it cannot happen and will not happen. That was also the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to the paramilitary organizations on both sides.
The morality and wisdom of such a circumstance was the subject of intense debate by many of the participants in our meetings, but it is nonetheless a circumstance with which all concerned must deal.
The parties may wish to consider, as an alternative, an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations.
From one side has come the demand that there must be some decommissioning before negotiations can begin. From the other has come the insistence that no decommissioning can occur until the very end of the process, after negotiations have produced an agreed political settlement.
An approach under which some decommissioning takes place during the process of the negotiations represents a middle course. It offers each side the opportunity to participate in a reasonable compromise that enables all to move forward toward their common objective: all-party negotiations leading to an agreed political settlement.
VI. On this crucial issue, two competing views were presented to us.
One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles and of a permanent end to the use of violence is the safe removal and disposal of illegally held arms; and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the necessity of prior decommissioning before the ceasefires were announced and no party should now be able to avoid that requirement.
The competing argument was that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the ceasefires; indeed, if it had been, there would have been no ceasefires. Those who entered into the ceasefires did so in the good faith belief that they would lead directly and immediately to all-party negotiations; and the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the ceasefires, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the ceasefires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately, with no further requirements.
We accept part of each presentation.
For those who demand prior decommissioning it appears likely that there is a need for something to provide the confidence necessary to enable all-party negotiations to begin.
For those who oppose decommissioning it appears likely that prior decommissioning will not occur.
As a result, even if the parties are able to agree on the middle course we earlier suggested, more will be needed to create the trust necessary to begin all-party negotiations. Indeed, the absence of prior decommissioning would increase the need to address the concerns of those who demand it. They are entitled to have the shadow of violence lifted from the peace process.
Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten the use forWe believe there should be public commitment and adherence, to enable the politicfundamental parties close to them to influrinciples of democracy and non-violence. All those negotiations, orwho aspire to change any aspect of the outcome ofparticipate in all-party negotiations with whichshould affirm they disagree. Givir commitmen the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern such principles.
The commitmentsVII. Accordingly, we recommend address those concerns directly. First, eachat partyies to thesuch negotiations would publicly affirm itstheir total and absolute commitment, in general terms, t:
1. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;
2. Second, inTo the specific contextotal disarmament of the negotiall paramilitary organizations, each party would agree (a) t;
4. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or to threaten the use of force, to influence the course or the outcome of suchall-party negotiations; and (b)
5. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in suchall-party negotiations and to useresort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree.
The principles woIn order to be meaningful and alsoeffective, such commit all parties to thments would, of course, have total disarmament of all apply to the paramilitary organizations, and to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commissionemselves.
VIII. Theose commitments, when made o demand honored, would preclude the use of force, ommissioning prior the threat of the use of force, before, during, and after all-party negotiations, They would focus all do so out of concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: The total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will be truly an exercise in democracy, not influenced by violenforce, or the threat of violence.
V. With respect to the first of the specific questions contained in paragraph seven ofe use of force, to enable the Communiqué, the modalipolitical parties of declommissioning, we to the following guidelines. These recommendm to influence the negotiations reflect estimates of the natur, or to change and scaley aspect of the arsenals in question, provided to us by the governments and their security services. We belieoutcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given these estimates to be accurate. The guidelines should be acceptable to all who would participate in the history of Northern Ireland, this is negotiations. The details would have to be determined by the parties themselves through negotiatio an unreasonable concern.
1. The decommissioning process shoultments we recommend addresuggest neither victory nor defeat
The ceasefires and the peaceose concerns directly. First, each process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through politty to the negotiations would publicaly affirmeans. Thits essential fact should be reflectotal and absoluted clearlyommitment, in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that angeneral terms, to democratic and exclusively party lose face.
2. THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS SHOULD BE VERIFIED BY AN INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY
The decommissioning process should be verified by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to all partiful means of resolving political issues. The commission would be appoSecond, inted by the British and Irish Governments on the basis ofspecific consultations with the other parties totext of the negotiating process.
The commission shons, each party would be ableagree (a) to operate withrenout hindrance in both jurisdictionfor themselves, and should enjoy appropriatto oppose legal status and immunity. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequaty effort by others, to use field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify, or to threaten the decommissioning prouse of forcess, the commission should be able to call upono influence the rescources and the relevant technical expertisor outcome of the Britishsuch negotiations; and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.
Individuals or organizations wishing to deposit arma(b) to abide by the terms of any agreements (including weapons, explosives, ammuni reached in such negotiations and detonators) for decommissioning, or to provide information which would result in the decommissioning of armaments, would have the option of do use democratic and exclusively peaceful methods ing so through the commission or through the designated representativesrying to alter any aspect of the British or Irish Governat outcoments. Parties would also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves, subject to verification byh the commissiony disagree.
3. The decommissioning process shprinciples would not expose individuals to prosecution
Individuals directly involved in the decommissioning process should becommit all parotected from prosecution relating to the possession of those armaments, on the basis of amnesties estotablished in law in both jurisdictions. Asarmaments made available for decommissioning, whether directl of all paramilitary or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examinganizations, and information obtained as a result of theto agree that such decommissioning process shouldarmament must be inadmissiverifiable as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdi satisfaction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organize their participation in the de of an independent commission.
These commissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments ontments, when made and honored, would preclude the use of force, or their behalf.
4. The decommissioning process should contribute to public safety and to generating confidence in the peace process and in threat of the use of force, before, during, and after all-party negotiations.
The decommissioning process c, They would encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including: the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated reprfocus all concerned on what is ultimately essentatives oal if either government, for subsequent destruction; the provisionun is to be taken out of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequentIrish politics: The total and verifiable destruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either government; and the destruction of armaments by of all paramilitary organizations. That should encourage those currently in possession obelief them.
In all cases,at the decommissioningpeace process should result in thwill be complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for thly an exercise destruction of armaments would include the physical destruction of small arms anddemocracy, not influenced by violence other weapons, the controlled explosionthreat of ammunition and explosives, and oviolence.
IX. We join ther forms Gof conventional munitions disposal, within the two jurisdictions. Priorrnments, religious and community should be accorded throughout to ensuring that arrs, and maments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.
The decommissionothers in condemning punishment killing process wouland be fully verified by the commission, which would record information required to moniatings. They contribute tor the process effectively, othear than that which could be deemed to constitute forensic evidence. In monitoring progress, the commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and andt those who have used violence to resolve political issues in the past will do so again in the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Thfuture. Accordingly, we recommission would report periodically to relevantend that the parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.
5. Decommissioning should be mutual
Details regardingto such negotiations publicly affirm the implementation of thir total and absolute decommissioning process, including supporting confidence-building measures and its timing and sequencing, should receive a high priority in the process of all-party negotiations. Decommissioning wouldhat punishment killings and beatings stop and to take place on theffective basis of theps mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organizarevent such actions,.
VIX. It will be important for all participants to take practical steps to build confidence throughout the process of all-party negotiations. In the course of our discussions, many subjects were raised which, although outside our remit, are relevant to the peace process and to the development of trust. We believe it appropriate to address some of them, since an agreed political settlement resulting from all-party negotiations cannot be achieved solely by reference to the issue of decommissioning.
Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate the parties' commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been exiled.
Early action by the Governments in implementing agreements regarding the transfer of relevant prisoners between jurisdictions would bolster trust, as would implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.
Different views were expressed to as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organizations. We accept and share the view that there is no equivalence between such weapons and those lawfully authorized. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."
Likewise, a review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons would contribute to the building of trust. We also share the hope, expressed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalized as soon as possible.
Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected bodassembly. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Bodies elected in accordance with accepted principles of fair and equitable representation express and reflect the will of the people. To be part of the peace process, an elected body should include the requisite parties, operate within the three-strand process, and serve only to facilitate agreement on all three strands.
IX. The divisions in Northern Ireland are historic and deep, but we believe they are outweighed by the nearly universal longing for a just and lasting peace. In the words of one of those with whom we spoke: "The single most potent force in Irish life today is the desire for peace." It is that force which creates the present opportunity. Bold and courageous leadership can now translate the desire for peace into the reality of peace.