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THIRTEENTH DRAFT - REORDERED BY STAFF6

INTRODUCTION

On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communiqué which announced the launching of a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations."

One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known as the political track.

The other track concerned decommissioning and was set forthelaborated in the Ccommuniqué:

"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."

WWe are an outside group wmrith no stake Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and national Body. Thiin the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring a freshour and unbiased perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to helpment.

To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London; the first December 15 through 18, 1995, the second January 11 through 21, 1996. In addition, we held an organizational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.

In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other relevant persons. A list of all those with whom we met is attached. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

This assessment represents our best and our unanimous judgement. There are no differences among us.

Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the problem, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed, so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.

That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Ministers Major and Bruton (and before him Reynolds) are essential steps to a lasting peace. We commend as well the individual actions of some political parties and their leaders and of other institutions, organizations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.

We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for collaboration with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. The events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire. That knowledge encourages us in making our recommendations.

We are convinced that the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland seek lasting peace and reconciliation in a just society in which violence or the threat of violence plays no part. Members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been largely silent in Northern Ireland. All with whom we spoke agreed that people want peace. It was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.

Notwithstanding recent reprehensible ugnant lapsepunishment killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the ceasefires reflects a commitment by the paramilitary organizations to the peace process. The existence of the ceasefires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" the removal of weapons from the political process.

Since the cease-fires the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists - so widespread, in fact, that it tends to be taken for granted.

No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.

II. We were asked to Confidence-building measureprovide an independent assessment We were asked to deal with the issue of decommissis andT mutual trust aCommto many ofe keyeregumts to conting. It is a seriousued progress in the peace problem. But it is also a symptom ofcess. Suggestions made to us oEstablishing trustcfidence-ing measures covered a lad ranger problem that may be described in a word: Trust. Or, more precisely, the lack of trust.

Put simply, neither ;beyo ofIal Body. Confid-buildasures brought up during our discus that the two and relevant parties could conside trusts the other. Common to many of our meetings wrcourseace process include, but are not limio,du ofces;nsfere arguments, steepeds appropriateprisonerChanges ional histructureapprovalmajory, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence,ity only; protection of minority rightsRR;Revision and eventual well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspiciminfor example, clarification and hostilityof t".

But a resolution of thDifferentvewwere expressed to us as toweapons to be decommissioning issue - or any oed. InCommunique, the Governments made clear their viewuit issue - w limiteohose weapons held illegally by porganizations.ccept be found if the parties resort toand sharview that their packed arsenals of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what re is no equivalence between such weaponshose lawfully authorized. In this really needed isgard, however, we welcome the decommissioning of mindsets in Northern Ireland. Establishing trust will require courage and involve risk. But tmentthe Governments of the United Kingdom andRepublic of Irel,s stated in paragraph 9Communique, "to continue to take responsive measures, advisedtheir risks of a continued lack of trust are much greater.

espective secury uthoti, as the threat"III.; nevertheless we emphasizet role thatin the pecepcessIVWe believe public commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence would help to build the necessary trust. All those who aspire to participate in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.

.

PRINCIPLES

(reinsert principle on punishment beatings)

III. Accordingly, we recommend that parties to such negotiations publicly affirm their total and absolute commitment:

1. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;

2. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations;

3. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;

4. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten the use of force, to influence the course or the outcome of all party negotiations;

5. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached

in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree.

In order to be meaningful and effective, such commitments would, of course, have to apply to the paramilitary organizations themselves.

We join the Governments, religious and community leaders, and many others in condemning punishment killings and beatings. They contribute to the any fear that those who have used violence to resolve political issues in the past will do so again in the future. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations publicly affirm their total and absolute commitment that punishment killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING

IV. The second of the specific questions to which we were asked to respond was "to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve [full and verifiable decommissioning]."

We are satisfied that everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with decommissioning. There are differences on the timing and context - indeed those differences led to the creation of this Body - but they should not be allowed to obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmamentOne practical measure during the initial stage of the d processcludeprovisioninventories by paramility groups, o be followed bthe inspection, by the commission, of selected stockpiles. Decommissioning of all paramilitary organizations.I That is, and until it is achieved must continue to be, a paramount objective.

We are unable to answer that question without reference cto timing. That is because we have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.

Prior decommissioning is unlikely to occur. We reached that conclusion only after careful consideration, based upon intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the leadership of the security forces, north and south, and many others. That was the view of the vast majority of the organizations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they all are opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favor it. But they are convinced that it cannot happen and will not happen. That was also the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to the paramilitary organizations on both sides.

The morality and wisdom of such a circumstance was the subject of intense debate by many of the participants in our meetings, but it is nonetheless a circumstance with which all concerned must deal.

The parties may wish to consider, as an alternative, an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations.

From one side has come the demand that there must be some decommissioning before negotiations can begin. From the other has come the insistence that no decommissioning can occur until the very end of the process, after negotiations have produced an agreed political settlement.

An approach under which some decommissioning takes place during the process of the negotiations represents a middle course. It offers each side the opportunity to participate in a reasonable compromise that enables all to move forward toward their common objective: all-party negotiations leading to an agreed political settlement.

On this crucial issue, two competing views were presented to us.

One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles and of a permanent end to the use of violence is the safe removal and disposal of illegally held arms; and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the necessity of prior decommissioning before the ceasefires were announced and no party should now be able to avoid that requirement.

The competing argument was that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the ceasefires; indeed, if it had been, there would have been no ceasefires. Those who entered into the ceasefires did so in the good faith belief that they would lead directly and immediately to all-party negotiations; and the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the ceasefires, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the ceasefires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately, with no further requirements.

We accept part of each presentation.

For those who demand prior decommissioning it appears likely that there is a need for something to provide the confidence lnecessary y close to enable all-party negotiations to begin.

FMor tellingly, it was the view of the leadership of thFrome who oppose decommissioning it appears likelerity forces, north andoh,atleaders ofosy that pr could not obtain a prior decommissioning of arms, even if they were willing to do socommissioning will not occur.

As a result, even if the parties are able to agree on the middle course we earlier suggested, more will be needed to creall-partyate the trust necessary to begin all-party negotiations. Indeed,commit or commit the absence of prior decommissioninand to therebyg would increase the need to address the concerns of those who demand it. They are entitled to have the shadow of violence lifted from the peace process.

Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten the use force, to enable the political parties close to them to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern.

The commitmentsI we recommend address those concerns directly. First, each party to the negotiations would publicly affirm its total and absolute commitment, in general terms, to y use ofdemocratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issuesfce;. Second, in the specific context of the negotiations, each party would agree (a) to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or to threaten the use of force, to influence the course or outcome of such negotiations; and (b) to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in bidsuch negotiations and to use democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with whichprincipleuse of consent, as contaiin they disagree.

DowThe principles would Street Declalso commit all parties to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizationstionwipect to any agree, and to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission.

These reachedecommitments, when made and honored, would preclude the use of force, or the threat of the use of force, before, during, and after all- party negotiations.

4. [Possible Alternative Languag, They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: The total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will be truly an exercise in democracy, not influenced by violence or the threat of violence.

MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

V. With respect to the first of the specific questions contained in paragraph seven of thPrinciple No. 4: T Communiqué, the modalities of decommissioning, we the following guidelines. These recommendations reflect estimates of the naturre and scale of thto abide byarsenals in question, provided to us by the governments and their security services. We believe these estimates to be accurate. The guidelines should be acceptable to all who would participate in the negottermsy outegiations. The details would have to be determined by the parties themselves through negotiation.

1. The decommissioning process shouldof suggest neither victory nor defeat

The ceasefires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through politto which al majority of theameans. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party lose face.

2. THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS SHOULD BE VERIFIED BY AN INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY

The decommissioning process should be verified by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by Northern IrBritish and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.

The commission should be able to operate without hindrance in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and in the Republic of Ireland givd immunity. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon their assentresources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

Individuals or organizations wishing to deposit armaresortments (including weapons, explosives, ammunitions and detonators) for decommissioning, or to provide information which would result in the decommissioning of armaments, would have the option of doing so through the commission or through the designated representatives of the British or Irish Governments. Parties would also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves, subject to verification by they ma commission.]

3. The 5. To no3. aatdecommissioning process should nishmnot expose individualsent to kprosecution

Individuals directly involved in the decommissioning process should be pranhotected from prosecutie on replating to the posrsession of thoinhcse armaments, on the iplesbasis of amnesties estaoublished in dlaw in both jurisdi actions. Ao commit all parties to the total disarmaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in eitheakr jurisdiction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organize their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on stheps to prevent such ir behalf.

4. The decommissioning process should contribute to public safety and to generating confidence in the peace process and in all-party negotiations.

The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including: the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequentIn orderestruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either government; and the destruction of armaments byngfu those currently in possession of them.

In all cases, the decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for theffective, such commitdestruction of armaments would include the physical destruction of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal, within the two jurisdictions. Priority would, ofshould be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

The decommissioning process would be fully verified by the commission, which would record information required to monitor the process effectively, other than that which could be deemed to constitute forensic evidence. In monitoring progress, the commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and and,apply tthe paramilitRoyal Ulster Constabulary. The commorganizaission would report periodically to relevants themselves, parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

5. Decommissioning should be mutual

Details regarding the implementation of the decommissioning process, including supporting confidence-building measures and its timing and sequencing, should receive a high priority in the process of all-party negotiations. Decommissioning wouldoliticaes with which take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and pre closelyarticipation of the paramilitary organizaedtions,

FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

VI. IIIt will be important for all participants to take practical steps to build confidence throughout the process of all-party negotiations. I in the course of our discussions, many subjects were raised which, although outside our remit, are relevant to the peace process and to the development of trust. We believe it appropriate to address some of them, since an agreed political settlement resulting from all-party negotiations cannot be achieved solely by reference to the issue of decommissioning.

Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate the parties' commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been exiled.

Early action by the Governments in implementing agreements regarding the transfer of relevant prisoners between jurisdictions would bolster trust, as would implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

Different views were expressed to as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organizations. We accept and share the view that there is no equivalence between such weapons and those lawfully authorized. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."

Likewise, a review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons would contribute to the building of trust. We also share the hope, expressed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalized as soon as possible.

Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Bodies elected in accordance with accepted principles of fair and equitable representation express and reflect the will of the people. To be part of the peace process, an elected body should include the requisite parties, operate within the three-strand process, and serve only to facilitate agreement on all three strands.

IX. The divisions in Northern Ireland are historic and deep, but we believe they are outweighed by the nearly universal longing for a just and lasting peace. In the words of one of those with whom we spoke: "The single most potent force in Irish life today is the desire for peace." It is that force which creates the present opportunity. Bold and courageous leadership can now translate the desire for peace into the reality of peace.