DRAFT FOURTEEN4

INTRODUCTION

On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communiqué which announced the launching of a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations." 1

One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known as the political track.

The other track concerned decommissioning and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:

"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such eveidence on its merits."

We are an outside group with no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help.

We considered our task in the light of its responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations should be able to be realized; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the Briish and Irish governments.

To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, December 15 through 18, 1995; the second, January 11 through 21, 1996. In addition, we held an organizational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.

In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other organizations, institutions, and individuals. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

This assessment represents our best and our unanimous judgement. There are no differences of opinion among us.

Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the problem, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed, so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.

That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Ministers John Major and John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) are essential steps to a lasting peace. We commend as well the individual actions of some political parties and their leaders and of other institutions, organizations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.

DISCUSSION

I. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been largely silent in Northern Ireland. All with whom we spoke agreed that people want peace. They want lasting peace and reconciliation in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. It was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.

We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for collaboration with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. The events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire. That knowledge encourages us in making our recommendations.

Notwithstanding recent reprehensible punishment killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the ceasefires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.

Since the ceasefires the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists - so widespread, in fact, that it tends to be taken for granted. Indeed, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.

II. In paragraph five of the Communique we were asked to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning. It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem; the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.

But a resolution of the decommissioning issue - or any other issue - will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mindsets in Northern Ireland. Establishing trust will require courage and involve risk. But the risks of a continued lack of trust are much greater.

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IkII. EWe are satisfied that ethe need to veryone with whom we spokle agrees in principle with the need to decommission. There are differences on the timing and context -- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but they should not be allowed to obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total amd verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. That must continue to be a paramount objective.

RECOMMENDATIONS

PRINCIPLES

IV. The parties seek negotiations to reach an agreed political settlement. They want the gun taken out of Irish politics. If they are to achieve those objectives, there must be public commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. All those who aspire to participate in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.

Accordingly, we recommend that parties to such negotiations publicly affirm their total and absolute commitment:

1. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;

2. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary orgarnizations;

3. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;

4. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all party negotiations;

5. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree.

6. To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

Another principles publicly is needed. We join the governments, religious leaders, and many others in condemning punishment killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to resolve political issues in the past will do so again in the future. They have no place in a lawful society.

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V. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to enable the political parties close to them to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern.

The commitments we recommend address those concerns directly. Each party to the negotiations would publicly affirm its total and absolute commitment, in general terms, to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues. With specific reference to the negotiations, each part would agree to renounce the use or threat of force to influence the negotiations or to change the outcome.

The principles would also commit all parties to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations, and to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission.

These commitments, when made and honored, would preclude the use or threat of force, before, during and after all-party negotiations. They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise in democracy.

Commitment to Decommissioning

VI. The second of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communique asks us "to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning."

We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.

After careful consideration, based upon intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilitary organizations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organizations on both sides. It was also the view of the vast majority of the organizations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they all are opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that will not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must deal.

On this issue, competing views were presented to us.

One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles and of a permanent end to the use of violence is the safe removal and disposal of illegally held arms; and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the necessity of prior decommissioning before the ceasefires were announced and no party should now be able to avoid that requirement.

We were told in the competing view that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the ceasefires; indeed, if it had been, there would have been no ceasefires. Those who entered into the ceasefires did so in the belief that they would lead directly and immediately to all-party negotiations; and the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the ceasefires, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the ceasefires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately, with no further requirements.

We believe that each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side. Those who at present refuse to engage in inclusive dialogue without prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is genuine and irreversible, and that the threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process ofd confidence-buildingrequiret ie negotiations or to change any agreed settlement. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiations is genuinely being offered to address legitimate concerns of their tradition and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.

Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse.

That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.

As an alternative, the parties could consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place as a part of the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge.

Such an approach would represent a middle course. It offers each side the opportnity to participate in a reasonable compromise that enables all to move forward toward their common objective: all-party negotiations leading to an agreed political settlement.

[Alternative: As an alternative, the parties could consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place as a part of the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach would represent a middle course. It offers each side the opportnity to participate in a reasonable compromise that enables all to move forward toward their common objective: all-party negotiations leading to an agreed political settlement.]

MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

VII. With respect to the first of the specific questions contained in the communique, we recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided to us by the governments and their security forces. We believe these estiamtes to be accurate. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves and should receive high-priority in all-party negotiations.

1. The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.

The ceasefires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to surrender.

2. The decommissioning process should be verified by an independent commission.

The decommissioning process should be verified by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.

The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

Individuals or organizations wishing to deposit armaments (including weapons, explosives, ammunitions and detonators) for decommissioning, or to provide information which should result in the decommissioning of armaments, should have the option of doing so through the commission or through the designated representatives of the British or Irish Governments. Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves, subject to verification by the commission.

The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

3. The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.

Individuals directly involved in the decommissioning process should be protected from prosecution relating to the possession of those armaments, on the basis of amnesties established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organize their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

4. The decommissioning process should contribute to public safety. and to generating confidence in the peace process.

The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including: the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either government; and the destruction of armaments by those currently in possession of them.

The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for the destruction of armaments would include the physical destruction of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

5. Decommissioning should be mutual

Decommission would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organizations. This offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence incrementally.

FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

VIII. It will be important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many subjects were raised which, although outside our remit, are relevant to the process and to the development of trust. We believe it appropriate to address some of them, since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the issue of decommissioning.

Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been exiled.

Early action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust, as would implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

Different views were expressed to as the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organizations. We accept and share the view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those lawfully authorized. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."

We share the hope, expressed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalized as soon as feasible. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons would contribute to the building of trust. So, too, would the review of the use of plastic bullets, and the continued expansion of the representation of minorities in the police force.

Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We believe that, given the overwhelming commitment to peace, the circumstances could be created for the decommissioning process to proceed during all-party negotiations, within the three-stranded structure on which the parties have already agreed. The confidence to achieve these could in turn be created by a broadly acceptable elective process.

Finally, in the discussions we had, the social and economic development of Nortehrn Ireland and its communities was emphasized time and again in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.

IX. The divisions in Northern Ireland are historic and deep, but we believe they are outweighed by the nearly universal longing for a just and lasting peace. In the words of one of those with whom we spoke: "The single most potent force in Irish life today is the desire for peace." It is that force which creates the present opportunity. Bold and courageous leadership can now translate that desire into the reality of peace.

However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains to be done on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties must recognize that a critical turning point has been reached in the peace process. It will either move forward on Northern Oreland will regress to the horror of the last 25 years.

Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply continue the stalemate. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the vast gulf which for so long has separated the two traditions requires a willingness to take risks for peace. We urge the parties to consider the issue of decommissioning, and all of the issues in the political track, in this light.

Last week we stood in the center of Belfast looking at a thirty foot high wall topped with barbed wire. That wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division of Northern Ireland into two warring groups. To the outsider both are warm generous, friendly. It is only with themselves that they are fearful and hostile.

Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. They want a future of peace, equality and prosperity. In the words of one of those with whom we spoke: "The single most potent force in Irish life today is the desire for peace." It is that force which creates the present opportunity.

This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. Either the peace process will move forward or this society will slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.

Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the peace line requires a willingness to take risks for peace.

We urge the parties to consider the issue of decommissioning - indeed all of the issues - in this light.