Report of the International Body

22 January 1996

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments issued a Communiqué which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a " 'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations."

2. One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known as the political track.

3. The other track concerned the the decommissioning of arms of arms and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:

"5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."

4. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.

5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second, 11 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.

6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials and representatives of other organisations and institutions. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

II. DISCUSSION

7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.

8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in advancing the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) have been essential to the peace process. They have been joined by other political leaders, institutions, organisations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.

9. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations can be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance the peace process.

10. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. The people want that silence to continue. They want lasting peace in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from those in the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.

11. Notwithstanding reprehensible "punishment" killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.

12. Since the cease-fires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists -- so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

13. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.

14. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked "to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue." It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.

15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue -- or any other issue -- will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.

16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire.

17. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to decommission. There are differences on the timing and context --- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but they should not obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That must continue to be a principle objective.

18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE

19. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.

20. Accordingly, we recommend the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:

a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;

b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;

c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;

d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all party negotiations;

e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,

f. To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

21. We join the Governments, religious leaders and many others in condemning "punishment" killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful society.

22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiatiWith respect to tosn do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern

Theprinciplets we recommend address those concerns directly.

23.

These commitments, when made and honuore,, wouldprmovde the threat of forc, before, during and after all-party negotiation., They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics:an agreed political settlement and tThe total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organszations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will trulybe an exercise in democrac, not one influenced by the threat of violence.y.

IV. COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING

24I. The second of the specific questionsin paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks ua "to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achiev"e[full and verifiable decommissionin]"

25.

We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.

26. Aafter careful consideration,on the bais ofn intensive discussions with theGGovernments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many other,t hehave concluded that the paramilriarty organszationswill not decombmissio any armso priorto all-party negotihawnesn. That was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organszations on both sides It was also the view of tThevast ajmoity of the organisationsy andindividuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not thats thy are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary,y manyfavour it. Butf thyepae convinced that it will not happen. Thait iseth realitye with which all concerned must deal.

27. Ccompeting views wereadvancte on prior decommissioning.d

One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principle,s and of a permanent end to the use of violenc,e is the safe removal and disposal ofparam iitaryd arm,; and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the ned forf prior decommissioning before the ceas-efires were announced andshould not nowd be able to avoid that requirement.

28. In tThe competing vie we were toldw that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the ceas-efire, and thatf hadit been, there would have been no ceas-efire; that tThose who entered into ceas-efires did so in the belief they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and tat thhe request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the ceas-efire were declareds, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the ceas-efires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediatel, with no further requirements.

29.

Webelieve thart eac side of this argument reflects a core of reasonablweaonccrn which deserves to be understoods edaddressed by the other side.

30. Those who gisist on priore decommissioningneed to be reassuredw thatthe comm tmenitto peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violencse isgenui n and irreversible, and theae the hteat or rue of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process ofy negotiation or to change any agrdee,se tlement.

31. Ttoshewho have been persuaded to abandon vrilence foorthe peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaoninful andg inlusive process of negotiation is genuinely being offereed to addressthe legitimathe concerns of teir traditions mandthe need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.

32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcroem tis impaeses

That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.

V. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

33. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms must take place before all-party negotiations can begin. The other side has insisted that no decommissioning can take place until the end of the process, after an agreed settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current impasse.

34. The parties should conside, an approach under which some decommissioning would take placeduringf the process of all-party negotiation, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse must be overcome. While both sides have been adamant in their positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach provides them that opportunity.

35. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to uie the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounatog trunt and confidencet.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE

MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

36I.Tthe first of the specific questionsin paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us "to identify anedadv se oina suitable and acceptable me tod for full and verifiablhedecommissioning."

37. Wwe recommend the following guideline on the modalities of decommissionings.TThese recommendationsa rtr aliestc in lights of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question,estimates of which were provided to us by theGGovernments and their securityforices.WWe believe these estiaates tobhe accurate.

38. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to determined by the parties themselves.

The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defea.t

39.

The ceas-efires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to surrender.

The decommissioning process should place to the satisfaction of an independent commission.

40. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.

41. The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.

42. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to public safety.

43. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments. Procedures for the destruction of armaments would include the cutting up and chipping of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal.

44. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including:

- the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either Government, for subsequent destruction;

- the provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either Government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; and,

- the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either Government.

Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.

45. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

The decommissioning process should befully verifable.y

46. Whate veo theiensioee tGthneoier thedce ejictio of armaments, including thtelre ae sionof weaupoesbyd thex Ii tlsthemselvens,ivp nhiation must occuor rh theetatsfacption of the commission.

47. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecutio.n

48.

Individuals involved in the decommissioning process shouldnot be prsteucted rpo the possession of those armament; amnesties should bes established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction

49.. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organsze their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

The ddecommissioningprocess shwould bemutual.

50. De commissioingh wouldtake place mor thebasis of the mutual commitment and participationa of theparamilistar organisatsioss This offersg themtrates another oupporbi iy to usve the process ofdDecommissioning e uild confidence one step at a time during negotiationss.

VII.

FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

51I. Itise important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, manyurged that certain actiont other than decommissioningsbe takent tobuild confidencet. Wemake no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but we believe it appropriate tocomment on some since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to theissue of decommissionin of armsg.

52.

Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have beenforced to leave their communities under threatd.

53. Continuedy action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trus. Sos wouldearly implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

54.

Different views were expressed as o tthe weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organszations. We accept and share tate view. There is no equivalence between such weapons andthose held bl security forcesd. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advisedby their respective security authoritie,, as the threat reduces."

55. We share the hops, expressed by many on all sides, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation permits. Aa review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapon and ttheuse of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force would contribute to thesbuilding of truste.

56.

Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. Wenote the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Elections held in accordanceewi t democratic principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within theh thre-strand structure, an elective process could contributeé t the building of confidence.

57. Finally, the importance of further progress in the social anldeconomic develo ment of Northern Ireplnd and its communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in the context of building confidence anedestablish ign lasting peace.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

58. Last week whestood in Belfast and looked at a thirty foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed wireX. Te wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of thhe divisio of the people ofn Northern Irelandinto two hostile communities. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselevs thhey arefearful and antagonistic.

59. Yet, it is now cleard ebond doubt thaty thevast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn awayg rfm the bitteorp us.tTheoneis a powerful desire for pearce inNorthern Ireland." It is thatdesirce which creates the present opportunity

60. This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move forward or tshs society could sliipba k to the horror of the pcst quarter ceatury.

61. Rigidnadhere ce by the parties tnw heit prst positioan will simply continute te stalemhaetwhich has alrea y lastdd too long. In a eocsety as deeply divided as NoithrrneIreland, reach ig acrosso the"peace line" rquires e wilalngness to take risks forf peace

62. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a future of peace, equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Ireland.

George J. Mitchell John de Chastelain Harri Holkeri

22 January 1996.