TALKS: PAPER ON SUCCESSOR TO THE AGREEMENT

Thank you for copying me your draft 'wish list' for the articles of a successor to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. This builds well on (and might more prominently cross-refer to) the principles set out in Mr Cooke's paper of 4 June and, subject to the amendments Mr Archer has already suggested, I have now little of my own to add - although one or two colloquialisms and references that might bewilder the uninitiated (eg the Kilburn factor) might not survive a revision. My only comments therefore are those that follow.

2. I am not sure what Mr Archer means by a 'more broadly based agreement or structure'. If he means more comprehensive or wide ranging I disagree; if he means that it should command the confidence of the NI community as a whole, I agree. Something on the lines of your own formulation about 'widespread support' seems nearer the mark, therefore.

3. More generally in paragraph 1, two things seem to me of outstanding importance in Anglo-Irish relations: the formal recognition by the Irish Government that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom; and more effective co-operation against terrorism (which might be stretched to cover building confidence in the Security Forces in NI). Theologians differ about the degree of generality in 'aims' statements. But if you did not want to add further objectives I would be happy to see both attached as examples, in your third tiret. Failing that, the points need underlining in what you say on Articles 1 and 7 (see below).

4. The idea that Northern Ireland becomes part of a united Ireland when 50% + 1 favour it, still seems to me (and, I think, others) a nonsense. But there is little chance of renegotiation; and, as you say, it may never happen - or not for a long time.

5. Paragraph 3. Even if I had not read the joint Unionist position paper of 9 June, I would still argue that Mr Archer's formulation underestimates, as your original formulation in my view rightly did not, the degree of continuing Unionist unhappiness. Perhaps something on the following lines might square all circles:

"Active Unionist opposition to the Agreement has diminished over the last 6 years but it has failed to win acceptance and formal opposition remains. Their acquiescence in a new Agreement could, however, be secured provided that the Unionists were consulted in advance over its terms, and provided that any new document was in a sufficiently different format from the 1985 Agreement to resist accusations of having climbed down from their opposition to the Agreement. On this basis they could be prepared to accept continuing machinery for intergovernmental consultation in matters which remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State". (The last change reflects what I recall the DUP conceded in the Talks so far).

6. Paragraph 7. I do not believe we merely 'want' an explicit acknowledgement of NI status as part of the United Kingdom. Substitute 'require' therefore and amend sentence six as follows: "But a new Agreement which fails to claify the constitutional position will lack credibility and it is hard to conceive of any new Agreement which did not contain it gaining widespread acceptance. This would, in turn, jeopardise[, possibly/probably fatally,] the chances of a successful outcome of the Talks process".

7. I think I agree with the last sentence of that paragraph but it is slightly obscure. So that, on reflection, you might want to put a full stop after Articles 2 and 3.

8. Paragraph 14. As you know, I am, as a British citizen, quite apart from NI policy concerns unhappy at the idea of another state having rights in our jurisdiction which are not reciprocated: it smacks of 19th Century 'capitulations'. Thus, although I do not enthuse over the right to make nominations in the non-transferred, I favour - even as a negotiating play - pressing for reciprocity (here and elsewhere) where this is not counter-productive (eg the Kilburn factor). So I think you are right to include the possibility here.

9. Paragraphs 16 and 18. We should spell out in terms opposition to Irish attempts to persuade us to include a commitment to a 100% accompaniment of all or [sic] designated Army patrols. Also we should indicate our intention to try and sign up the Irish to building confidence in the Police, Army and Administration of Justice.

10. As for security co-operation itself, I agree both here and elsewhere that we might be best advised to seek to enunciate principles rather than list items which will become obsolete. However, we need those principles to be comprehensive and right. Mr Leach might therefore want to suggest any new generalities, over and above general enhancement, for which we ought to be pressing.